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Identity politics are not a new phenomenon in the Middle 
East; they have witnessed several ebbs and flows (Telhami 
and Barnett 2002). The current era is characterized by a 
distinctive level and intensity of identity politics, however, 
which must be seen as an integral part of the emergent 
structure of regional politics. This essay advances three 
main claims about the current “flow” of identity politics 
in the region. First, the rise of ethno-religious politics 
cannot be explained in terms of the specificities of Arab 
politics because the trend is not limited to Muslim 
majority countries. Israel offers a prominent but generally 
overlooked example. Second, the sharpening of ethno-
religious difference is the result of strategic action under 
specific enabling conditions. The sense of insecurity and 
fear in periods of transition is a crucial enabling condition. 
Ironically, however, a heightened sense of insecurity not 
only acts as an enabling condition but is also the outcome 
of the politics of fear adopted by political leaders in the 
region. Third, the rise of identity politics is a trend on a 
broader scale, as seen in the United States and Europe.  
The memo concludes by reflecting on the role of local 
actors and developments as well as on the implications of 
the growing power of ethno-religious politics in the Middle 
East—and beyond.1 
Beyond Muslim sectarianism: Identity politics in Israel
Discussion of Identity politics in the current Middle East 
often focuses exclusively on sectarianism or on the role 
of political Islam (e.g. POMEPS 2013). But what type of 
identity politics are we referring to? By invoking universalist 
values and ideas, identity politics may be inclusive. But if 
politics are framed on the basis of belonging to allegedly 
primordial ethnic or religious groups, as is the case in the 
Middle East at present, an exclusionary and antagonistic 
1   The author would like to thank Maria-Louise Clausen, May Darwich, Waleed Hazbun, Amaney Jamal, Kristina Kausch, Mark Lynch, Karim Makdisi 
and Morten Valbjørn for great comments on a previous draft of this memo. 
type of identity politics is at work. In parallel, we have 
been witnessing the securitization of religious and ethnic 
identities in the region, that is, the invoking or construction 
of communities as being under threat (Malmvig 2015: 32; 
2014). These collective identities, which are or have become 
real, are moved to the realm of “panic politics” (Buzan et al. 
1998: 34), thereby legitimizing exceptional means. Sectarian 
identities have turned into sources of conflict (Darwich 
and Fakhoury 2017), fomenting fragmentation within and 
among states. Current identity politics in the region thus 
differ from those in the past, most notably pan-Arabism 
with its unifying rhetoric at the supranational level (no 
matter the divisions it caused among states in practice) 
(Kerr 1971; Valbjørn and Bank 2012).  
While it is fashionable to invoke the age-old Sunni-Shi’a 
divide as the explanation for the current violence in the 
region, ethno-religious politics have also been on the rise 
in Israel. 
Ethno- religious conceptions of state- and nationhood were 
built into the Israeli state from the outset, as Zionism’s 
objective of creating a “state of the Jews” indicates. In 
recent decades, identity politics in Israel have clearly been 
on the rise (Del Sarto 2017a). This development is reflected 
in the ever-growing power of the neo-revisionist Israeli 
Right, which in turn manifests in important changes in 
both domestic Israeli politics and in its foreign policy. 
The recent adoption of the “Jewish nation-state law,” which 
anchors the definition of Israel as the Jewish nation-state in 
the country’s basic laws (Israel’s version of a constitution), 
is perhaps the most obvious case in point. The law reserves 
the right to self-determination to the Jewish collective only, 
relegating the Palestinian-Arab minority which constitutes 
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about 20% of Israeli citizens to a secondary status outside 
the collective.  Numerous opinion polls confirm the strong 
domestic support for ethno-religious conceptions of state- 
and nationhood. For example, a growing number of Jewish 
Israelis think that a “Jewish state” is more important than 
a democratic one (Hermann et al. 2014). In 2016, 52% 
of Jewish Israelis believed that Israeli citizens who are 
unwilling to declare that Israel is the nation-state of the 
Jewish people should be stripped off their voting rights. A 
staggering 59% of Jewish Israeli respondents oppose the 
participation of Arab parties in governments (Hermann et 
al. 2016). According to another poll, 48% of Jewish Israeli 
respondents regarded the Palestinians’ recognition of Israel 
as the state of the Jewish people as more important than 
reaching a peace agreement with them (Israel Democracy 
Institute 2016).
Dominant perceptions of existential threats emanating 
from the outside world shape this emergent power of 
ethno-religious ideas in Israel. The prevailing view is that 
the country is facing existential threats, with the ultimate 
objective of its enemies being the destruction of the 
“Jewish state.” While these notions are not new (Maoz 
2009), the securitization of Jewish identity increased after 
the outbreak of the second Palestinian Intifada in 2000. 
With terrorism becoming a major concern, Israeli political 
leaders claimed that “there is no partner for peace” on the 
Palestinian side. They also referred to the inherently evil 
nature of Iran and its proxies, including Hizballah and 
Hamas, while warning of a possible “second Holocaust” 
(Klein Halevi and Oren 2007). These ideas convey a strong 
sense of besiegement and tend to define the regional reality 
as a struggle between the Arab/Muslim world (or large 
parts of it) and the Jewish people. 
The domestic support for these positions, and the 
policies they prescribe, has been striking. For example, 
a vast majority of Jewish Israelis came to believe that the 
Palestinians are not interested in peace (Halperin and 
Bar-Tal 2007; Israel Democracy Institute 2018). Between 
80% and 94% of Jewish Israelis supported Israel’s three 
wars on the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip (Ben Meir 2009; Israel 
Democracy Institute 2014) – an extremely high percentage 
considering the high number of Palestinian fatalities. A 
vast majority of Jewish Israelis is, and remains, afraid 
of Iran obtaining nuclear weapons (Israel Democracy 
Institute 2017). Accordingly, the domestic support for 
Netanyahu’s preferred option of bombing Iranian nuclear 
sites was large (Center for Iranian Studies 2009)—and 
probably still is. 
Of course there is a material basis to at least some of 
these threat perceptions: terrorist attacks and saber-
rattling neighbors are real. However, while fears can be 
manipulated, they contradict the notable improvement of 
Israel’s security environment post-Arab uprisings: Israel 
is certainly concerned with the presence of Hizballah and 
Iranian forces in neighboring Syrian territory, but Assad’s 
Syria is no longer a threat and Hizballah is bogged down 
in Syria for now. Furthermore, Egypt’s al-Sisi shares Israel’s 
hostility towards Hamas and Israel’s ties to Saudi Arabia 
and a number of smaller Gulf monarchies have improved, 
based on their common dislike of Iran. And Israel’s hawkish 
policies have the full support of US President Trump.  
Strategic action and the politics of fear
These developments in Israeli identity politics can be 
explained in terms of the same theories which account 
for the rise of sectarianism and other identities in the 
rest of the Middle East. Political elites may construct 
ethno-religious antagonism in order to acquire or 
maintain power (Fearon and Laitin 2000). Corroborating 
that group leadership (and thus agency) is crucial, the 
literature also stresses that specific socio-economic 
and political circumstances enable “successful” identity 
politics. In this context, studies highlight the important 
role played by collective threats in breeding ethnocentric 
and authoritarian attitudes and behavior (e.g. Fritsche 
et al. 2011). The important point is that insecurity and 
fear—whether genuine or generated—are not only key 
enabling conditions that breed the rise of ethnocentric 
politics (Fritsche et al. 2011). They are also the outcome 
of strategic action, namely the politics of insecurity and 
the securitization of collective identities in which political 
leaders engage. In other words, leaders in the Middle East 
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may feel threatened and insecure, but they also have every 
reason to cultivate a deep sense of insecurity: it increases 
the legitimacy and domestic support of the exceptional 
politics they adopt, for the sake of “security.” Hence, the 
“politics of fear” often trigger a peculiar vicious circle. 
In the case of Israel, the central role of Jewish history in the 
construction of Israeli identity acts as a predisposition for 
the current rise of ethno-religious politics. In other words, 
a deep sense of insecurity was built into the Jewish-Israeli 
collective experience from the outset, which the ongoing 
conflict with the neighbors only reinforced (Zerubavel 
1995; Kimmerling 2001). The growing power of ethno-
religious conceptions can also be linked to demographic 
shifts that have widened the basis of right-wing voting 
behavior over the decades.2 More recently, the violence of 
the second Intifada and the collapse of Oslo were crucial: 
They contributed to a general sense of insecurity and fear, 
prompting most Israeli voters to cast their ballot for the 
political Right (Berrebi and Klor 2008). 
Agency matters, too. Then-Prime Minister Barak deserves 
the credit for coining the “no Palestinian partner for 
peace” slogan after the failed Camp David summit in 
2000 (Halperin and Bar-Tal 2007). In addition, the Israeli 
army and the media promoted one-sided representations 
of reality (Dor 2004). But perhaps most importantly, 
amid rising sentiments of insecurity during the Intifada, 
Israel’s right-wing governments have promoted identity-
based conceptions of threats. They have highlighted the 
danger of terrorism targeting the Israeli Jewish collective, 
repeated the claim that there was no one to talk to on the 
Palestinian side, and insisted that Iran was an existential 
threat (see Del Sarto 2017a for details). Israeli governments 
have thus engaged in the politics of insecurity and fear. As 
the conflict with the Palestinians became redefined as an 
exclusively ethnic struggle (Klein 2010), political debates 
have been replaced by a general acceptance of a hardline 
approach to security.
2   These include the shift toward a majority of Mizrahi Jewish voters since the 1970s, the steady growth of Israel’s Jewish religious population (higher 
birth rates) and the immigration from the former Soviet Union in the 1990s. 
A look at the broader Middle East confirms that the 
interaction between structural change and agency is 
a crucial factor in the rise of ethno-religious politics 
in periods of uncertainty. For example, the collapse of 
the Ottoman Empire and the struggle against Western 
colonialism created an “identity vacuum” which “fuelled 
the rise of Arab nationalism” (Hinnebusch 2013: 150). 
Arab leaders were quick in using Pan-Arabism in their 
quest for regional hegemony (Kerr 1971). Similarly, the 
rise of political Islam from the 1970s onwards occurred 
in a period of profound uncertainty, caused by the 1967 
defeat of Arab armies against Israel (Al-Azm 2012) and the 
decline of Pan-Arabism. Similarly, the rise of Shi’a identity 
from the mid-1970s onwards took place in a period of 
uncertainty, with a new generation of politicized Shi’a 
religious leaders – and the new regime in Iran after the 
1979 revolution – exploiting identity for political ends. 
The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 triggered an 
unprecedented wave of ethno-religious polarization 
from the mid-2000s onwards. With Iran becoming more 
assertive after the defeat of archenemy Saddam Hussein, 
the US intervention prompted a growing antagonism 
between Sunnis and Shi‘a. The sectarian politics of then 
Iraqi Prime Minister Al-Maliki’s would only deteriorate the 
situation. This case once more exemplifies the significant 
role of self-interested actors in accentuating and exploiting 
ethno-religious difference in situations of pronounced 
instability. Finally, in the extremely volatile period post-
Arab uprisings, with Arab regimes being concerned 
with their survival (Ryan 2015), regional powers have 
been accentuating sectarian differences in their quest for 
regional hegemony (Valbjørn and Bank 2010; Lynch 2016). 
Beyond the Middle East
Exclusionary identity politics do not seem to be a Middle 
Eastern prerogative. In the US and Europe, right-wing 
populist movements are gaining support, with tribalism, 
victimhood and xenophobia being on the rise (e.g. 
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Fukuyama 2018). But in the absence of comparable levels 
of conflict, what explains the rise of identity politics in 
“the West”? While I do not have a definite answer, and 
with every case having its specificities, two suggestions 
can be made. But we should first recall that security, or 
the lack thereof, is a subjective sentiment. While there is 
clearly a difference between living in a Syrian war zone, 
or, say, in Switzerland, threats or perceived threats—to 
survival, security, or economic status—seem to be equally 
significant. 
Against the background of globalization and the spread 
of neoliberalism, the 2008 financial crisis bred a lasting 
sense of insecurity in many Western societies. It entailed 
cuts to real wages, rising inequality and poverty, a 
shrinking welfare state, and the erosion of the economic 
status of the middle class. In many states, politicians—of 
all stripes—have not addressed these issues, leaving the 
playing field to populist forces. The appeal of identity 
politics may thus be a consequence of this development. 
Yet ironically, identity politics also contribute to the spread 
of unchecked neo-liberal economics and their inherent 
inequality (Fraser 2017; Richardt 2018): while diverting 
the attention from crucial political questions, they atomize 
societies into different “tribes” that could otherwise join 
forces to address pressing economic and political issues. 
Economic insecurity is also widespread in the Middle 
East. In many Arab states, the expansion of neo-liberalism 
forged the emergence of a class of nouveau riches linked 
to political power (Guazzone and Pioppi 2012), along with 
rising inequality. And Israel and Turkey are among the 
eight OECD countries with the highest income inequality 
(OECD 2018).  
Secondly, the role of social media seems to be relevant. 
Acting as so-called echo-chambers among like-minded 
users, social media have been accused of spreading 
racism, misogyny and tribalism.3 People also seem to 
react stronger to negative messages, with posts that 
trigger fear having the highest media shares. Right-wing 
3   See Microsoft’s 2016 launching of an AI chat-bot named Tay, which was meant to learn from its interaction on social media. It quickly learned to 
tweet racist and misogynist comments, to the point that Microsoft decided to end the experiment after only 16 hours (Hayasaki 2016).  
populist forces in the US and in Europe, and their foreign 
supporters, have aptly manipulated and exploited popular 
feelings of insecurity, anger, and fear, as evidenced by 
Russian internet trolls and fake social media accounts 
during the last US electoral campaign. Social media may 
thus provide a fertile ground for ethno-religious politics in 
Western and Middle Eastern societies alike. 
Conclusions 
A pronounced sense of insecurity in periods of transition 
is both an enabling condition for the “successful” 
manipulation and securitization of ethno-religious 
identities and the outcome of the politics of fear adopted 
by aspiring or incumbent leaders. The resulting vicious 
circle of exclusionary identity politics points to the 
mutually constitutive nature of structure and agency. 
Political leaders thus engage in antagonistic identity 
politics out of fear and/or to legitimize their rule, but their 
policies—often bolstered by assertive foreign policies—
only increase the sense of insecurity while potentially 
destabilizing the region further. Moreover, ethno-religious 
politics prevent the emergence or consolidation of 
liberal polities that could engage in regional cooperation 
(Solingen 2007). The conflict potential of the region is thus 
likely to remain high. 
Second, traditional boundaries of state sovereignty are 
increasingly blurred, as state and non-state actors become 
connected through powerful identity dynamics (Philipps 
and Valbjørn 2018). Perhaps ironically, transnational 
identity alliances may actually undermine the authority of 
those national leaders. This is significant as many regimes 
in the region lack domestic legitimacy, which has only 
worsened post-Arab uprisings (Hudson 2015; Del Sarto 
2017b). The securitization of identities also legitimizes 
the meddling of external actors in the domestic affairs of 
Middle Eastern states, again to the detriment of national 
political leaders. 
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Third, external interventions (most notably the US invasion 
of Iraq and its long-term consequences) and global power 
shifts contribute to the region’s volatility, as does the 
persistence of violence post-Arab uprisings. However, an 
exclusive top-down approach to regional developments is 
insufficient. While global, regional, and domestic dynamics 
interlock and condition each other (Clausen, Darwich, 
Hazbun, Ulrichsen), our case points to the crucial role 
of local actors. The significance of endogenous Middle 
Eastern actors and factors thus validates the argument 
made by Snyder (1993) on the domestic source of regional 
conflict.
Finally, while each case has its specificities, in this case 
a comparative perspective to the study of Israel and 
the broader Middle East (Barnett 1996) is extremely 
useful—in spite of its unpopularity. Furthermore, the rise 
of identity politics and the decline of liberalism in “the 
West” (Zielonka 2018) seem to embed the Middle East in 
peculiar political dynamics that transcend the region. The 
phenomenon of identity politics thus defies the notion of 
Middle Eastern exceptionalism, together with a narcissistic 
“region-centric perspective” (Valbjørn). To conclude, the 
question of how to put the genie of antagonistic identity 
politics back into the bottle is of fundamental importance 
for the future of the Middle East—and far beyond. 
References
Al-Azm, Sadiq (2012). Self-Criticism after the Defeat, 
London: Saqi.
Barnett, Michael N., ed. (1996). Israel in Comparative 
Perspective: Challenging the Conventional Wisdom, Albany: 
SUNY Press.
Ben Meir, Yehuda (2009). “Operation Cast Lead: Political 
Dimensions and Public Opinion,” Strategic Assessment 11(4), 
Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, 29-34.
Berrebi, Claude, and Esteban F. Klor (2008). “Are Voters 
Sensitive to Terrorism? Direct Evidence from the Israeli 
Electorate,” American Political Science Review 102(3): 279-
301.
Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde (1998). 
Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner.
Center for Iranian Studies (2009). “Public Opinion Poll: 
Main Findings,” Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University.
Darwich, May and Tamirace Fakhoury (2016). “Casting 
the Other as an Existential Threat: The Securitisation of 
Sectarianism in the International Relations of the Syria 
Crisis,” Global Discourse 6(4): 712-732.
Del Sarto, Raffaella A. (2017a). Israel under Siege: The 
Politics of Insecurity and the Rise of the Israeli Neo-
Revisionist Right, Washington, D.C.: Georgetown 
University Press. 
Del Sarto, Raffaella A. (2017b) ‘Contentious Borders in 
the Middle East and North Africa: Context and Concepts,’ 
International Affairs 93(4): 787-797.
Dor, Daniel (2004). Intifada Hits the Headlines: How 
the Israeli Press Misreported the Outbreak of the Second 
Palestinian Uprising, Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press.
Fearon, James and David Laitin (2000). “Violence and 
the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity,” International 
Organization 54(4): 845-877.
Frazer, Nancy (2017). “From Progressive Neoliberalism 
to Trump—and Beyond,” American Affairs 4(1), at 
https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2017/11/progressive-
neoliberalism-trump-beyond/
Fritsche, Immo, Eva Jonas and Thomas Kessler (2011). 
“Collective Reactions to Threat: Implications for 
Intergroup Conflict and for Solving Societal Crises,” Social 
Issues and Policy Review 5 (1): 101-136. 
Fukuyama, Francis (2018) “Against Identity Politics: The 




Guazzone, Laura and Daniela Pioppi (eds.) (2012) The Arab 
State and Neo-Liberal Globalization: The Restructuring of 
State Power in the Middle East, Reading: Ithaca Press.
Halperin, Eran and Daniel Bar-Tal (2007) “The Fall of the 
Peace Camp in Israel: The Influence of Prime Minister 
Ehud Barak on Israeli Public Opinion, July 2000-February 
2001,” Conflict and Communication online 6(2), at http://
www.cco.regener-online.de/2007_2/pdf/halperin.pdf
Hayasaki, Erika (2017) “Is AI Sexist?,” Foreign Policy, 16 
January, at https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/01/16/women-
vs-the-machine/
Hermann, Tamar, et al. (2014). “The Israel Democracy 
Index 2014: Highlights.” Jerusalem: The Israel Democracy 
Institute, at https://en.idi.org.il/search?q=The%20Israel%20
Democracy%20Index%202014%3A%20Highlights
Hermann, Tamar, et al. (2016): “The Israel Democracy 
Index 2016: Highlights.” Jerusalem: The Israel Democracy 
Institute, at https://en.idi.org.il/publications/11985
Hinnebusch, Raymond (2013) “The Politics of Identity 
in Middle East International Relations,” in International 
Relations of the Middle East, edited by Louise Fawcett, third 
edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 148-163.
Hudson, Michael C. (2015) “Arab Politics after the 
Uprisings: Still Searching for Legitimacy,” in Larbi Sadiki, 
ed., The Routledge Handbook on the Arab Spring, London: 
Routledge.
Israel Democracy Institute (2014). “The Peace Index: 
August 2014,” at http://peaceindex.org/indexMonthEng.
aspx?num=283 
Israel Democracy Institute (2016). “The Peace Index: April 
2016,” at http://www.peaceindex.org/indexMonthEng.
aspx?num=304&monthname=April, accessed 13 August 
2018.
Israel Democracy Institute (2017). “The Peace Index: 
November 2017,” at http://www.peaceindex.org/
indexMonthEng.aspx?num=327&monthname=November, 
accessed 13 August 2018.
Israel Democracy Institute (2018). “The Peace Index: July 
2018,” at http://www.peaceindex.org/indexMonthEng.
aspx?num=333
Kerr, Malcolm H. (1971). The Arab Cold War: Gamal 'abd 
Al-Nasir and His Rivals, 1958-1970, London, New York: 
Oxford University Press.
Kimmerling, Baruch (2001). The Invention and Decline 
of Israeliness: State, Society, and the Military, Berkeley: 
University of California Press.
Klein Halevi, Yossi and Michael B. Oren (2007). “Israel’s 
Worst Nightmare,” The New Republic, 30 January.
Klein, Menachem (2010). The Shift: Israel-Palestine from 
Border Struggle to Ethnic Conflict, New York: Columbia 
University Press.
Lynch, Marc (2016). The New Arab Wars: Uprising 
and Anarchy in the Middle East, Washington, DC: 
PublicAffairs.
Malmvig, Helle (2014). “Power, Identity and Securitization 
in Middle East: Regional Order after the Arab Uprisings.” 
Mediterranean Politics 19 (1): 145–148. 
Malmvig, Helle (2015) “Coming in from the Cold: How We 
May Take Sectarian Identity Politics Seriously in the Middle 
East without Playing to the Tunes of Regional Power Elites,” 
Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS) Studies 




Maoz, Zeev (2009). Defending the Holy Land: A Critical 
Analysis of Israel’s Security and Foreign Policy, Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press.
62
OECD (2018) Income Inequality (Indicator), doi: 
10.1787/459aa7f1-en, accessed 23 September 2018. 
Phillips, Christopher and Morten Valbjørn (2018). “‘What 
is in a Name?’: The Role of (Different) Identities in the 
Multiple Proxy Wars in Syria,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 
29(3): 414-434.
POMEPS (2013) The Politics of Sectarianism, Project 
on Middle East Political Studies (POMEPS) Study no. 
4, 13 November, at https://pomeps.org/wp-content/
uploads/2014/06/POMEPS_Studies4_Sectarianism.pdf
Richardt, Johannes (ed.) (2018) Die sortierte Gesellschaft: 
Zur Kritik der Identitätspolitik, Frankfurt a.M.: Novo 
Argumente Verlag.
Ryan, Curtis R. (2015) “Regime Security and Shifting 
Alliances in the Middle East,” in International Relations 
Theory and a Changing Middle East, POMEPS Studies 16, 
17 September, pp. 42-46, at http://pomeps.org/2015/09/17/
international-relations-theory-and-a-new-middle-east/
Snyder, Jack (1993) Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and 
International Ambition, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Solingen, Etel (2007) “Pax Asiatica versus Bella Levantina: 
The Foundations of War and Peace in East Asia and the 
Middle East,” American Political Science Review 101(3): 
757–80.
Telhami, Shibley and Michael Barnett (2002) 
“Introduction: Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle 
East,” in Shibley Telhami and Michael Barnett, eds. Identity 
and Foreign Policy in the Middle East, Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, chapter 1.
Valbjørn, Morten and André Bank (2012) “The New Arab 
Cold War: Rediscovering the Arab Dimension of Middle 
East Regional Politics,” Review of International Studies, 
38(1): 3-24.
Zerubavel, Yael (1995). Recovered Roots: Collective Memory 
and the Making of Israeli National Tradition, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.
Zielonka, Jan (2018) Counter-Revolution: Liberal Europe in 
Retreat, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
